Populism On the Rise: The Future of the EU
The recent Italian election has made abundantly clear something many are uneasy to admit: populism is alive and well in Europe. In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, political crises swept across the continent. In Greece, rioters took to the streets protesting government spending cuts, eventually leading to the victory of the anti-austerity, populist Syriza party. The United Kingdom saw the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration and anti-EU United Kingdom Independence Party, culminating in Brexit. In Germany, Alternative for Germany has seen increased electoral success drawing on frustrations over the migration crisis, despite the party’s ties to far-right, neo-Nazi groups. The populist, xenophobic National Front in France managed to get the largest vote share in the last regional elections, obtaining nearly 28% of the vote. The rise of these populist parties did not happen overnight. Their continued existence and recent electoral successes are the result of a complex combination of factors: disillusionment with the political establishment, economic stagnation following the financial crisis, the recent migrant crisis, and dissatisfaction with the European Union. The future of Europe depends on how these issues that have given rise to populism are dealt with by Europe’s leaders.
The victory of Emmanuel Macron in France and Angela Merkel’s successful attempt to form a government in Germany were seen as welcome signs that perhaps the worst of this ‘populist wave’ was over. On the contrary, these events actually show the precarious situation many of Europe’s establishment parties and politicians find themselves in. While Macron may be a centrist technocrat, his own party, La République En Marche!, relegated France’s two traditional political parties, the Socialist Party and the Republicans, to irrelevance in the last legislative election. In Germany, Angela Merkel formed a government after five months of grueling negotiations with opposition parties. Her own party, the center-right Christian Democratic Union, lost 65 seats and was only able to remain in power after creating a coalition with the Social Democrats, the party’s main opposition. She may have survived another election, but she has nevertheless emerged weaker for it. Italy’s election has now ended any illusion that the ‘populist wave’ has subsided.
Italy’s prime minister from 2011 to 2013, Mario Monti, wrote an op-ed in The Washington Post describing the election as a “nightmare for the EU.” Most interestingly, he blames Italy’s establishment parties for the country’s anti-EU sentiment, writing that “by blaming Europe for nearly everything that went wrong during their respective times in government, Berlusconi and Renzi paved the way for Salvini and the Five Star Movement’s Luigi Di Maio by instilling into the minds of Italians for years the anti-EU reflex on which the League and the Five Star Movement finally so skillfully capitalized.” Such an accusation is not completely unfounded. In the U.K., many establishment figures that opposed Brexit had, at best, lukewarm views toward the EU prior to the referendum. Only when it was too late did they come to the EU’s defense. Italy faced a similar situation. When it came time to vote, Monti said that “Italians have shown that they like the original populists better than the disguised ones.” Put in this context, the results make a lot more sense, but it’s only part of the story.
Even if many Italian politicians did not actively stoke anti-EU sentiment, Italian voters would still have plenty to be dissatisfied about. For one, Italy has long been a net contributor to the EU budget. In 2016, Italy contributed €2.348 billion more than it received back. In the grand scheme of things, this is a very small percentage of Italy’s GNI (gross national income), however voters understandably do not like the idea of sending money to other countries even as Italy’s real GDP growth has remained stagnant for over two decades. The European Commission website acknowledges Italy’s net contributions, but emphasizes that “this net balance does not accurately reflect the many benefits of EU membership. Many of them, such as peace, political stability, security and freedom to live, work, study and travel anywhere in the Union cannot be measured.” But that, of course, is exactly the problem. These intangible benefits are not easily represented by statistics. The drawbacks, on the other hand, are.
In addition, Italy, along with Greece, has been on the frontlines of the migrant crisis that has brought hundreds of thousands to Europe each year since 2015. Because of Italy’s geographic location, many migrants crossing the Mediterranean Sea go to Italy first, even if their goal is to reach another EU country. The EU’s border protection agency, Frontex, is understaffed and underfunded, delegating much of its responsibility to the Italian Navy. Because Frontex has designated Italy as the base of all sea operations, most rescued migrants are disproportionately dropped off in Italian ports, as opposed to ones in Spain, France, or Malta. Despite repeated overtures from the Italian government to restructure border protection and rescue operations, little action has been taken. Other member states are dealing with their own migrant crises and helping Italy is not their first priority.
Wanting to avoid the negative political fallout from taking in more migrants, other European nations have inadvertently exacerbated the political backlash against migrants in Italy. Immigration became one of the most hotly debated issues in the Italian election. The party League campaigned under the slogan, “Stop the Invasion.” Much of the rhetoric surrounding the migrant crisis has racist connotations, but not all opposition is racially motivated. Even those who support helping migrants are understandably frustrated at the country’s inability to properly deal with the crisis. It’s difficult to advocate taking in more people when the current migrant reception centers are already overcrowded and under-resourced. Italian voters feel like the country has been left behind by European leaders, which has played into the hands of Eurosceptic parties.
‘Italexit,’ an Italian exit from the eurozone, or the EU all together, still seems far-fetched, but it’s more likely now than it has ever been. Italy may very well end up with a government solely composed of Eurosceptic populists. That does not bode well for Brussels. It’s a situation that, ironically, may have been avoided had other European nations been more attentive to the political consequences of ignoring Italy’s calls for assistance with the migrant crisis. To be sure, given that over half of Italy’s trade is with other EU countries, the significant consequences of an exit would be hard to ignore, even for populist anti-EU politicians. How Brussels deals with Brexit may signal how Italy approaches things in the coming years.
Going forward, Italian politicians must come to terms with the fact that much of the country’s economic malaise comes from internal structural problems that would not be solved by ‘Italexit.’ Conversely, EU officials must realize that pursuing an “ever closer union” requires understanding the unique challenges each member state faces. Populism will not go away until the issues it brings up are properly addressed. To dismiss its rise as solely the result of racism, xenophobia, or ardent nationalism is to ignore the fact that not everything about the European experiment has been an unqualified success. Acknowledging its failures is a good first step to a constructive discussion on reforms.
The future of Italy and the whole of Europe may very well be bright, but only if these discussions and reforms start sooner rather than later.